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Abstract: 
We examine the determinants of corporate speculation and challenge the 
extant, conflicting evidence. Separating risk management (reducing 
currency-specific FX exposure) from speculation (increasing or holding 
currency-specific FX exposure constant), we provide unprecedented 
evidence that speculators are smaller, have more growth opportunities and 
possess lower internal resources than risk-managing firms. The refined 
granularity of our dataset stems from a unique regulatory environment, 
where a regulating authority recommends additional disclosures for FX risk 
management in excess of governing accounting standards. Our findings 
enable investors, henceforth, to identify speculation from public available 
sources, where our results substantiate the significance of such an extended 
reporting. Thus, this case of optional disclosures might serve as blueprint 
for further regulatory refinements in other settings.  
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1  We gratefully acknowledge access to the Compustat Global Vantage database provided by DALAHO, 
University of Hohenheim. We especially thank Dirk Hachmeister for extensive discussion and valuable 
feedback.  
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1. Introduction 
Corporates do not use derivatives exclusively for hedging purposes. Sufficient theoretical and 
empirical evidence of speculative activities2 has found its way into literature (Adam, Fernando, & 
Golubeva, 2015; Adam, Fernando, & Salas, 2017; Bodnar et al. 2011; Bodnar, Marston, & Hayt, 
1998; Brown, Crabb, & Haushalter, 2006; Faulkender, 2005; Glaum, 2002). The determinants of 
corporate speculation remain nevertheless inconsistent. Literature on financial risk management 
offers various theoretical solutions to explain why companies might have an incentive to 
speculate as opposed to hedge (T. Adam, Dasgupta, & Titman, 2007; Campbell & Kracaw, 1999; 
Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993; Stulz, 1996). Empirical evidence, however, is ambiguous, where 
Glaum (2002) summarizes in 2002 that most studies up to this date are at variance.  
Two potential explanations for this disagreement arise. First, the exclusion of potential 
speculation with derivative financial instruments was a weak point in terms of methodology of 
earlier research (Glaum, 2002). Nonetheless, including most recent evidence of studies that 
incorporate speculation (Adam et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2006; Géczy, Minton, & Schrand, 2007) 
reveals a similar picture. With regard to firms size, growth opportunities and corporate liquidity 
indicators, inconsistency on the determinants on speculation is once more prevailing (Adam et 
al., 2017; Brown et al., 2006; Géczy et al., 2007). A second potential clarification for the 
ambiguous empirical evidence originates from Judge (2007). With his comprehensive review of 
corporate hedging literature, Judge (2007) argues that a mixed outcome might be the result of 
potential sample biases, referring to deviating hedging definition among the studies. Comparing 
most recent research on speculation (Adam et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2006; Géczy et al., 2007), 
we detect that the results of Brown et al. (2006) and Adam et al. (2017) do not concur despite the 
mutual usage of the gold industry dataset.3 Since their approach on measuring speculation, which 
serves in both regression models as dependent variable, deviates, we assume that the non-
uniform outcomes on the determinants of speculation may be explained by different 
methodologies and definitions of speculation. We address this matter and investigate the 
determining factors of speculation using the additional disclosures of our unique dataset to apply 
an innovative methodology in an FX context.  
                                                 
2  The terms speculation and “selective hedging” have been used interchangeably  (T. R. Adam et al., 2017), 
where “selective hedging” describes the sizing, positioning, and timing of derivative transactions (Stulz, 
1996). 
3  While Brown et al. (2006)’s analysis covers the years of 1993 to 1998 across 44 gold producers, Adam et al. 
(2017) involves 92 firms from 1989 to 1998.  
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This publicly available data of French companies listed in the country’s superordinate stock 
market index provides unique FX information on a firm-currency level. Thanks to the granularity 
incited by the supervisor of the French financial markets with their recommendations that exceed 
IFRS requirements, we are able to calculate firm-, currency-, and year-specific hedge ratios and 
hence categorize aggregate currency positions as either risk management (reducing currency-
specific FX exposure) or speculative (increasing or holding currency-specific FX exposure 
constant). We subsequently classify companies as risk managers, frequent speculators or 
temporary speculators according to their speculative share relative to total firm exposure. The 
separation of risk management from speculative activities is affirmed by a recent interview study 
among French firms that indicates that some treasury officials reject while others accept any 
speculative activity (Gumb, Dupuy, Baker, & Blum, 2017). 
The results indicate that frequent speculators are lower in size, possess more investment 
possibilities and dispose of lower internal funds than risk managers, which taken together provide 
unprecedented empirical evidence for the convexity theories in an FX environment.4 In addition, 
our findings illustrate that speculation can be determined reading public corporate disclosures. 
Up to present, literature was in agreement that investors are, most probably, not capable to detect 
speculation by examining publicly accessible data (Géczy et al., 2007; Judge, 2007). Using the 
extended disclosures from our dataset, however, allows investors and further stakeholders 
henceforward to identify speculation using data from publicly available sources. Further, our 
findings illustrate the significance of the additionally disclosed information. It fosters the 
understanding of a firm’s FX risk management strategy and execution as well as enables the 
examination of corporate risk management activities from new analytic angles. This informational 
advantage might be beneficial for diverse interest groups in various respects: e.g. for financial 
analysts [investors] to provide [use] more relevant evaluations including the aspect of potential 
speculation, for the corporate environment to benchmark and improve their own currency risk 
management activities, which might, in turn, lead to more stability in a broader sense. (Hecht & 
Lampenius, 2017) further document the importance of the extended disclosures. Using the same 
dataset, they provide evidence for the necessity to separate between risk management and 
speculative positions in the context of prior hedging outcomes. 
We contribute to the literature on the determinants of speculation in two ways. First, by means of 
company-, year- and currency-specific hedge ratios, we introduce an innovative methodology to 
                                                 
4  In line with this outcome of our quantitative analysis, Albouy & Dupuy (2017) find, by means of an e-mail 
and interview survey between 2010 and 2015, that smaller and highly leveraged firms tend to speculate 
more among French non-financial firms. 
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define speculation and hence separate it from risk management on a firm-currency level. 
Consequently, we can provide unprecedented empirical evidence on the determinants of 
speculation in corporate FX management. Second, it is, henceforth, possible to uncover 
speculation using our publicly available corporate disclosures and methodology. In addition, our 
unparalleled results illustrate the significance of this informational advantage that involves 
manifold potential benefits. This case of voluntary, supplementary recommendations from a 
regulating authority might hence serve as a blueprint for regulatory disclosure improvements in 
suitable areas.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops the 
hypothesis. Section 3 provides the sample description, the definition of our employed measures 
as well as our methodology. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.  
2. Hypothesis development  
Deviating from Modigliani-Miller ideals in which risk management does not increase shareholder 
value, diverse theoretical considerations justify why firms could engage in hedging or speculative 
activities. In terms of hedging, apart from classical managerial motives such as information 
asymmetry considerations, tax reasons or debt capacity coupled with financial distress costs 
(Froot et al., 1993; Judge, 2007; Smith & Stulz, 1985), Froot et al. (1993) mention the aspect of 
underinvestment when external financing is more expensive than internal financing. Easing the 
variability of cash flows through risk management measures can prevent underinvestment and 
increased external financing requirements that might be costly to firms.  
As regards speculation, Stulz (1996) argues that from a theoretical point of view, particular 
companies might be inclined to speculation. That is, companies having both private information 
combined with an adequate financial resilience might benefit from speculative transactions. 
Making use of superior market or industry knowledge such as specialized information on e.g. 
future FX-rates, might lend these firms a comparative advantage leading to extraordinary profits 
in derivative transactions. These, according to Stulz (1996), typically bigger firms should have the 
financial capabilities to withstand losses from erroneous market views, which in turn prevents a 
firm from the underinvestment problem due high costs of external funds. In an FX-environment, 
however, Stulz (1996) states that most FX dealers do not possess specialized information about 
the future development of foreign currencies. Consequently, non-financial firms most likely also 
lack this expertise. In addition, they are supposedly not endowed with an enhanced ability to cope 
with FX risks and possible severe losses (Stulz, 1996).   
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Alternatively, Stulz (1996) illustrates a rationale in favor of speculation for firms in financial 
distress. Having have nothing lose, such firms might be motivated to speculate even without 
superior knowledge in order to generate exceptional, rescuing outcomes. 
This alternative explanation builds a bridge to the convexity theories of Adam et al. (2007) and  
Campbell & Kracaw (1999). Based on a profit function convex in investment, the authors build 
upon the model of Froot et al. (1993) and argue that under certain circumstances, firms might 
perceive speculation, rather than hedging, as optimal strategy. This incentive to not hedge but 
gamble arises from the convexity of their investment opportunities leading to the argument that 
positive speculative outcomes allow for profitable investments that elsewise would not be carried 
out. Campbell & Kracaw (1999) expect that this effect might be empirically verifiable with firms 
that demonstrate the following features: substantial growth opportunities [growth], modest internal 
funds [liquidity] as well as high cost of asymmetric information [size]. Following Adam et al. (2017) 
and Graham et al. (2001), we assume that smaller firms suffer more from the market 
imperfection of informational asymmetry and are hence financially more constrained in raising 
external funds.  
Provided that non-financial firms do not exhibit a comparative advantage in an FX-context, we 
adhere to the theoretical foundations of Adam et al. (2007) and Campbell & Kracaw (1999) and 
test the hypothesis that the convexity theories are empirically supported in FX risk management. 
In detail, we expect a negative relation between firm size and speculation, a positive relation 
between corporate growth opportunities and speculation, as well as a negative relation between 
corporate liquidity and speculation. We test the hypothesis by means of a new methodology to 
define speculation and separate it from risk management. Our dataset provides access to 
company-, year-, and currency-specific hedge ratios that enable us to separate risk-managing 
(reducing currency-specific FX exposure) from speculative positions (increasing or holding 
currency-specific FX exposure constant) and classify firms accordingly as risk manager or 
frequent [temporary] speculator (for details, refer to section 3).  
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3. Data and Methodology 
We use publicly available accounting data from France for the period of 2010 to 2015. The so-
called ‘registration document’ advocated by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), 
supervisor of the French financial markets, provides information on foreign currency risk 
management of unprecedented data granularity. Going far beyond the specifications of IFRS 7, 
§33 and 34 (Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), 2009), this dataset is the result of the unique 
regulatory environment that supports extended disclosures via an optional supplement. Hecht & 
Lampenius (2017) provide further details about this database. 
Starting with 333 French firms in the CAC All-Tradable index as of April 2016, we drop financial 
firms (17), firms without (significant) FX exposure (183) and firms that do not follow the 
recommendations of the AMF (70). For our final sample of 63 firms, we hand-collect the 
reported FX-risk management information and match it with firm characteristics obtained from 
the Compustat Global Vantage database. The resulting 1,835 firm-year observations are the basis 
for the firm classification detailed below. Further, we drop four firms due to unavailability of firm 
characteristics and we drop all duplicated values to rely on one observation per company and year 
(resulting in a sample of 59 companies and 337 observations). This necessary step arises, since for 
one company and one year, the firm characteristics do not change for the several employed 
currencies. Further, we winsorize all firm characteristics to the 1st and 99th percentile to 
eliminate data outliers. The company-specific FX data is not winsorized, given that this data is 
hand-collected and all data points are meaningful.  
Consistent with literature on FX risk management, forward contracts are by far the most 
important hedging instrument (Bodnar et al., 2011, 1998) and our sample firms mainly report the 
utilization of forward or future contracts; options and swaps are mentioned less frequently. In 
line with Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Beber and Fabbri (2012) we exclude foreign currency 
swaps from the analysis whenever explicitly referred to in the registration document. If a 
differentiation of FX instruments is not undertaken and hence swaps cannot be separated from 
other FX instruments, we rely on the combined figure. The aggregation practice of swaps with 
forward or future contracts of a few firms should not lead to a systematic bias, since FX forward 
contracts, as indicated above, account for approximately 64% of the FX risk management routine 
(Bodnar et al., 2011, 1998). We ignore all transaction costs related to hedging activities. 
Following Hecht & Lampenius (2017) and the variance-minimization model (Aabo, 2015; Stulz, 
1996), we assume that the intention of risk management is to reduce the expected volatility 
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resulting from future movements in market variables (Hull, 2015), in our case FX rates5. In 
contrast, speculation refers to an intentional increase of the expected future volatility to enhance 
future profits. To analyze a firm’s FX activities, we calculate hedge ratios ( HR ), defined as the 
percentage of FX exposure covered by financial instruments. The hedge ratio in t  ( tHR ) is 
defined as = Ebt t tHR H , where tH  denotes the hedged amount in t  and 
b
tE  the exposure 
before hedging in t . Given that our data record contains actual FX exposure that can be positive 
or negative, which is combined with short or long hedged nominal amounts, HR  can be both 
positive and negative. Note that a short [long] derivative position is identified through a negative 
[positive] sign. Table 1 classifies aggregate currency positions according to HR  and the implied 
impact on volatility in three parts: risk management positions seek a reduction in volatility with 
− < <2 0HR , where e.g. .5HR = −  and 1.5HR = −  result in the same volatility, active 
speculative positions increase volatility with 2HR < −  or 0HR > , and passive speculative 
positions keep volatility constant with = −2HR  or = 0HR .  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
According to this analytical approach, we can identify aggregate currency positions that either 
decrease, increase or keep currency-specific FX exposure constant. In a next step, we classify 
each of our sample firms as either risk managers or frequent or temporary speculators. We do so 
by calculating the value-weighted proportions of hedging and speculation6 per firm, i.e, we 
evaluate the exposure prior to hedging per aggregate currency position to overall firm exposure. 
Firms are then labeled risk managers (RM) when they speculate with less than 20% of their 
exposure, whereas with more than 80% of speculative, value-weighted activities, firms are labeled 
frequent speculators (FS). Further, we term the group of firms between 20 and 80 percent 
temporary speculators (TS). The classification scheme reveals 54% of our sample firms as RM, 
17% as FS and the remaining 29% as TS. The thresholds of 20 and 80 percent are not arbitrarily 
chosen, but originate from the analysis of Hecht & Lampenius (2017) Using the same dataset and 
sample firms, they show that – in the aggregate – firms hedge with about 80 percent of their FX 
exposure and speculate with the remaining 20 percent, again value-weighted with the total 
exposure before hedging per firm. 
                                                 
5  We assume that FX markets are efficient in the weak sense of informational efficiency (Fama, 1970).  
6  Speculation comprises now both active and passive speculation. 
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Following the implications of the convexity theories, we group the firm characteristics into the 
three categories size, growth and liquidity. In our multinomial logit model with the firm 
classification as response variable, the following firm characteristics serve as predictor variables. 
We measure firm size by the logarithm of total assets (size) and alternatively by the logarithm of 
market capitalization (size II). Growth opportunities are approximated by the ratio of research 
and development expenses over total revenue (R&D ratio) and as secondary proxy by capital 
expenditures to total revenues (capex ratio).7 Our approach to model the corporate liquidity 
situation is twofold. First, we calculate the liquidity indicators cash ratio (cash and short-term 
investments to total current liabilities), interest coverage ((pretax income + interest expense) / 
interest expense) as well operating (total) cash flow, standardized by total revenues. The first two 
ratios represent static balance sheet information, whereas the cash flow illustrates a dynamic flow 
figure. Second, we investigate corporate liquidity by analyzing the levels of indebtedness. We use 
the debt ratio (total liabilities to total assets) and since we are particularly interested in near-term 
settings, where profitable investments can only be realized due to positive speculative outcomes, 
we further employ the short-term debt ratio with total current liabilities to total assets.   
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 presents univariate statistics of firm characteristics of our sample firms. The financial 
characteristics are chosen corresponding to the theoretical basis of the convexity theories (Adam 
et al., 2007; Campbell & Kracaw, 1999). Further, we report the results of a t-test that compares 
the means values of the risk managers with frequent speculators (risk managers with temporary 
speculators) [frequent speculators with temporary speculators]. We rely on the Welch’s t-test due 
to (potential) unequal variances as well as sample sizes. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Focusing on the differences between firms that frequently speculate and those that follow risk 
management motive, we observe that, according to both measurements of size, frequent 
speculators are significantly smaller than risk managers.  
                                                 
7  Please note that we do not employ the book-to-market-ratio due to potential misinterpretations. Géczy et 
al. (2007) state off-balance sheet correlations with speculation as one potential explanation.   
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As regards growth potential measured by R&D expenditures to total revenues, frequent 
speculators exhibit significantly more investment opportunities compared to firms that follow 
risk management motives. Alternatively, using capital expenditures instead of R&D investments, 
confirms the results, where the differences between the groups are not significant.   
The two static as well as two dynamic short-term liquidity measures indicate that risk-managing 
firms possess more internal funds than frequent speculators. Statistically significant is, however, 
only the difference for interest coverage. Comparing indebtedness levels reveals that frequent 
speculators have significantly higher debt proportions than risk managers. In line with Campbell 
& Kracaw (1999), who expect low internal resources to finance current growth opportunities, we 
find the same relationship with even stronger significances for the short-term debt ratio.   
Consistent with this evidence, the size of firms that temporarily speculate falls in between these 
thresholds, i.e. being significantly smaller than risk managers and significantly bigger than 
companies that often speculate. For the firm characteristics categorized in growth and liquidity, 
Table 2 illustrates that the values for temporary speculators are always logically interjacent to risk 
managers and frequent speculators, with significant differences for e.g. the R&D ratio, interest 
coverage and the short-term debt ratio. 
4.2. Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Following the univariate analysis, we examine the relationship between the firm characteristics 
and speculation in a multinomial logistic regression. According to our company classification, the 
nominally scaled dependent variable can take the three categories 1) risk manager, 2) frequent 
speculator or 3) temporary speculator. The independent variables are (a selection of) the financial 
firm characteristics detailed in Table 2. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables of the 
multinomial logit analysis for our total sample8. The dependent variable counts 337 hand-
collected observations from the balance sheets of our sample firms. Differing observation 
numbers for the firm characteristics are explained by data availabilities in Compustat Global 
Vantage database.  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
                                                 
8  For the respective mean values and standard deviations of the divided sample into RM, FS and TS, please 
refer to Table 2.  
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Table 4 reports the results of the multinomial logistic regression with robust standard errors and 
with the risk manager class always as base category. The evidence provided is consistent with the 
univariate analysis. Table 4, Panel A presents our main regression model with one financial 
characteristic per category size and growth, as well as one short-term liquidity indicator and one debt 
measure. A one-unit increase in the variable size is associated with a reduction of -.43 in the 
relative log odds of being a frequent speculator compared to a risk manager. In other words, 
frequent speculators are more likely to be smaller than risk managers, a finding that confirms our 
expected negative relation between firm size and speculation.  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Similarly, companies that often speculate exhibit a much a higher probability, significant at the 
1% level, to have more growth opportunities than companies that follow risk management 
motives. This positive relationship between corporate growth opportunities and speculation is in 
line with our hypothesis.  
As regards internal funds, we find that frequent speculators are more likely to have lower 
operating cash flows and higher debt levels than risk managers, significant at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively. The observed negative relation between a firm’s liquidity situation and 
speculative activities contributes to our overall finding of empirical evidence for the convexity 
theories in a currency risk context.  
Table 4, Panel B reports an alternative regression model in dependence on our main regression 
model in Panel A with one firm characteristic per category, but in Panel B we substitute each 
variable to examine consistency. We observe the same relationships between frequent speculators 
and speculation as in Panel A, with the exception that interest coverage is not significant. 
Looking at temporary speculators where the interest coverage variable is significant at the 1% 
level with a very similar coefficient, however, mitigates this shortcoming.  
 
4.3. Robustness 
Up to present, empirical evidence on the determinants of speculation was conflicting. We assume 
that heterogeneous definitions of speculative activities and heterogeneous analytic methodologies 
have a stake in this disagreement. Our findings are the result of these two specifications, (i) of a 
new definition of speculation and (ii) of a new methodology to separate our sample into risk 
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managers or frequent or temporary speculators. To illustrate the robustness of our results, we 
apply the above multinomial logit analysis to a range of specifications of (i) and (ii).  
First, we detail two alternative specifications of (i), where we change the definition of speculation. 
Up to this point, the classification into RM, FS and TS was based on the limits of 20% and 80% 
(section 3). We alter these thresholds in a sensitivity analysis to the extent of +/- 10%. Table 5 
reports the resulting evidence, Panel A [B] for our main [alternative] regression model. Focusing 
on the differences of risk managers and frequent (temporary) speculators, we find overall robust 
evidence for both specifications, i.e. with the limits of 30%/70% as well as 10%/90% for both 
the main and alternative regression model (Table 5, Panel A and B, respectively). In both cases, 
speculation remains to be negatively correlated to size, positively correlated to growth and 
negatively to liquidity, where a higher debt ratio confirms the lower operating cash flow for 
frequent speculators in relation to risk managers. For the limits of 30%/70%, all stated 
relationships are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. The same applies to the limits 
of 10%/90%, with few exceptions. Furthermore, in a second specification of (i), we reduce the 
number of categories from three to two. In detail, we divide our sample in merely two 
homogeneous parts, where we attribute speculation with less [more] than 50% of a firm’s 
exposure to a risk manager [speculator]. The unreported results prove robust for all three 
categories size, growth and liquidity (FOR REVIEWER ONLY:  RESULTS ARE REPORTED IN 
Table 6). Overall, the results in Table 5, Panel A and B, confirm our main results and we deduce 
that they are not subject to a particular definition of speculation. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Second, we detail a different specification of (ii), where we evaluate the effect of an alternative 
separation of the sample into risk-managing and speculating firms. Building up on our hedge 
ratio classification from Table 1, we perform this robustness check directly on an aggregate 
currency level (a priori 1,835 firm-year observations, due to data availabilities of the firm 
characteristics in Compustat, the observation numbers in the regressions decrease) without our 
company classification. This implies that, contrary to before, we rely on our aggregate currency 
position distribution of risk management and speculative activities9 without value-weighing this 
distribution to the overall firm exposure. As a result, we do not obtain a company-wide 
homogeneous classification. This focus on the aggregate currency position level keeps an 
                                                 
9  Similar to section 3, we group active and passive speculation together.  
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unblended perspective without forcing a sum of positions into stiff structures with fixed 
thresholds. A point of criticism for this robustness check is that one company might be 
attributed for one currency to the risk-managing category and for another currency to the 
speculative category within the same year. The results presented in Table 5, Panel C [D] for our 
main [alternative] regression model, confirm our main findings between all three categories size, 
growth and liquidity of firm characteristics and speculation. For speculation, we still observe a 
negative correlation to size, a positive correlation to growth and again a negative correlation to 
liquidity. The positive coefficient of the debt ratio reveals once more that frequent speculators 
have higher degrees of debt compared to risk managers, which confirms the negative relationship 
for liquidity. All stated correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level, with the exception 
of the debt ratio in Panel C and the capex ratio in Panel D (10%). In the aggregate, our 
estimation for an alternative classification into risk-managing and speculating firms in Table 5, 
Panel C and D, confirm our main findings and we conclude that they do not depend on a 
particular methodology to separate risk-managing motives from speculative considerations in our 
sample.  
Finally, we test for a potential bias originating from our sample period. We observed diverging 
results using the same dataset but different subperiods (and different definitions of speculation) 
for Adam et al. (2017) and Brown et al. (2006). Consequently, we alter our sample period to 
check for robustness of our results. We observe (unreported) robust evidence when limiting our 
sample period to the years of 2010-2013 as well as 2012-2015 (FOR REVIEWER ONLY:  
RESULTS ARE REPORTED IN Table 7) 
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5. Conclusion 
Empirical literature is still in disagreement concerning the determinants of corporate speculation. 
Analysing most recent empirical evidence, we assume that the heterogenous findings on the 
determinants of speculation may be the result of different methodologies in defining and 
determining speculation. Our unique dataset enables us to calculate firm-, currency-, and year-
specific hedge ratios that allow for a new separation of risk management (reducing currency-
specific FX exposure) and speculative (increasing or holding currency-specific FX exposure 
constant) positions. We provide unprecedented evidence that speculators are smaller, have more 
growth potential and are endowed with lower internal resources compared to risk managers – 
findings that confirm the convexity theories (Adam et al., 2007; Campbell & Kracaw, 1999) in a 
corporate FX context.  
The refined granularity of our dataset originates from additional recommendations that exceed 
existing accounting requirements, advocated by the financial markets’ regulating authority. As 
these sources are publicly available, our findings enable readers and analysts of financial 
statements from now on to use public data in order to identify speculation. Further, our results 
underline the significance of such an informational advantage that entails various benefits for 
diverse stakeholders. This concept of voluntary suggestions for continuative disclosures in an FX 
context might consequently be a potential draft for regulatory enhancements in relevant 
environments.  
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7. Tables 
Table 1: Hedge Ratio Classification 
This table reports the hedge ratio ( HR ) classification, defined as the percentage of FX exposure covered by 
financial instruments ( Ebt t tHR H= ), where tH  and 
b
tE  denote the hedged amount in t  and the exposure before 
hedging in t , respectively. HR  captures risk management, as well as, speculative positions, where we define a 
positive [negative] FX exposure combined with a short position in a FX-forward contract to result in a negative 
[positive] HR , since a short derivative position is identified using a negative sign. On the other hand, a positive 
[negative] exposure in combination with a long position in a FX-forward contract is defined as positive [negative] 
HR . Based on this nomenclature, HR  separates risk management from speculation, where we introduce the 
following classification: (a) risk management, seeking a reduction in volatility with 2 0HR− < < ; (b) active 
speculative, seeking additional profits by increasing volatility with 2HR < −  or 0HR > ; (c) passive speculative, 
seeking constant volatility with 2HR = −  or 0HR = . 
Position Hedge Ratio Impact on Volatility 
Risk Management 
2 1HR− < < −   Decrease 
1HR = −  (Full Hedge * ) Decrease 
1 0HR− < <   Decrease 
Active Speculation  2HR < −  Increase 0 HR<  Increase 
Passive Speculation 2HR = −  None 0HR =  None 
* We do not know time-to-maturity of the derivatives, thus, a full hedge is not identical to a perfect hedge, as known from the literature (Hull, 
2015). 
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Table 2: Univariate Statistics of Firm Characteristics  
This table reports univariate statistics for the firm characteristics of our sample firms. The “RM vs. FS” column 
reports the significance level of a t-test comparing the mean values for the respective groups. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Size is the logarithm of total assets, size II the logarithm of 
market capitalization, the R&D [Capex] ratio divides the R&D Expense [capital expenditures] by total revenues and 
the cash ratio captures the sum of cash plus short-term investments divided by total current liabilities. Interest 
coverage is measured by the sum of pretax income plus interest expense, divided by interest expense. Total 
[operating] cash flow is standardized by total revenues and the [short-term] debt ratio captures total [current] 
liabilities in relation to total assets. 
 Risk Manager Frequent Speculator  Temporary Speculator   
 Mean SD Mean SD RM vs. FS Mean SD RM vs. TS  FS vs. TS      Size 8.24 1.52 6.89 1.63 *** 7.71 1.47 ** *** 
Size II 7.76 1.51 6.13 1.92 *** 7.18 1.73 ** *** 
R&D Ratio 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.18 *** 0.10 0.11 *** ** 
Capex Ratio 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06  0.04 0.02 **  
Cash Ratio 0.41 0.36 0.34 0.46  0.40 0.39   
Interest Coverage 158.76 472.29 14.15 33.69 *** 17.74 31.47 ***  
Total CF 0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.09  0.01 0.08   
Operating CF 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.11  0.11 0.08   
Debt Ratio 0.59 0.17 0.64 0.17 * 0.59 0.15   
Debt Ratio short term 0.34 0.14 0.45 0.14 *** 0.38 0.16 ** *** 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Sample 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the dependent (firm classification) and independent (firm characteristics) 
variables of the multinomial logit analysis for the total sample. Firm classification can take the values 0 [1] (3) for 
firms classified as risk managers [frequent speculators] (temporary speculators) according to their speculative share 
relative to total firm exposure. Size is the logarithm of total assets, size II the logarithm of market capitalization, the 
R&D [Capex] ratio divides the R&D Expense [capital expenditures] by total revenues and the cash ratio captures the 
sum of cash plus short-term investments divided by total current liabilities. Interest coverage is measured by the sum 
of pretax income plus interest expense, divided by interest expense. Total [operating] cash flow is standardized by 
total revenues and the [short-term] debt ratio captures total [current] liabilities in relation to total assets. 
 N Mean SD Min p25 p50 p75 Max Firm classification 337 1.04 1.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 
Size 336 7.86 1.60 4.09 6.83 7.93 8.92 11.13 
Size II 330 7.32 1.74 3.18 6.19 7.58 8.59 10.39 
R&D ratio 202 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.64 
Capex ratio 335 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.28 
Cash ratio 336 0.39 0.39 0.03 0.16 0.29 0.44 2.21 
Interest coverage 334 92.74 353.22 -15.06 3.52 7.98 18.15 2234.25 
Total CF 336 0.01 0.08 -0.33 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.24 
Operating CF 336 0.11 0.08 -0.07 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.39 
Debt ratio 336 0.60 0.16 0.26 0.48 0.60 0.72 1.02 
Debt ratio short-term 336 0.37 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.34 0.49 0.73 
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Table 4: Multinomial Logistic Regression  
This table reports the multinomial logistic regression results of our firm classification as a function of firm 
characteristics with robust standard errors and the risk manager classification as base outcome. The dependent 
variable can take the values risk manager, frequent speculator or temporary speculator according to their speculative 
share relative to total firm exposure. Based on the limits of 20% and 80%, firms are labelled risk manager [frequent 
speculator] (temporary speculator) when speculating with less [more] (between) than 20% [80%] (20% and 80%) of 
their exposure. The independent variables are (a selection of) firm characteristics detailed in Table 3. Panel A details 
our main regression model with one financial characteristic per category size and growth, as well as one short-term 
liquidity indicator and one debt measure. In Panel B, we substitute each variable to examine consistency in an 
alternative regression model. Size is the logarithm of total assets, size II the logarithm of market capitalization, the 
R&D [Capex] ratio divides the R&D Expense [capital expenditures] by total revenues, the operating cash flow is 
standardized by total revenues and interest coverage is measured by the sum of pretax income plus interest expense, 
divided by interest expense. The [short-term] debt ratio captures total [current] liabilities in relation to total assets. ∗, 
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.    
 
Panel A: Main regression model 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables  Coef.      p-value 
Risk manager Base Outcome 
Frequent speculator Size -0.427 0.027** 
 R&D ratio 25.605 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -17.415 0.000*** 
 Debt ratio 4.059 0.031** 
 Constant -0.553 0.791 
Temporary speculator Size -0.367 0.012** 
 R&D ratio 15.980 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -5.716 0.094* 
 Debt ratio 1.196 0.439 
 Constant 1.219 0.289 
Observations  203  
Pseudo R-squared  0.253  
 
Panel B: Alternative regression model 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables Coef.     p-value 
Risk manager Base Outcome 
Frequent speculator Size II -0.562 0.000*** 
 Capex ratio 10.500 0.006*** 
 Interest coverage -0.004 0.129 
 Debt ratio short-term 6.940 0.000*** 
 Constant -0.278 0.774 
Temporary speculator Size II -0.204 0.012** 
 Capex ratio -11.036 0.043** 
 Interest coverage -0.004 0.004*** 
 Debt ratio short-term 1.029 0.379 
 Constant 1.126 0.142 
Observations  327  
Pseudo R-squared  0.147  
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Table 5: Robustness Checks 
This table reports the (multinomial) logistic regression results of our firm classification as a function of firm 
characteristics with robust standard errors. The independent variables are (a selection of) firm characteristics detailed 
in Table 3. Panel A and C [B and D] refer to our main [alternative] regression model detailed in Table 4. In the 
robustness checks detailed in Panel A and B, the dependent variable can take the values risk manager, frequent 
speculator or temporary speculator according to their speculative share relative to total firm exposure, with the risk 
manager classification as base outcome. Further, Panel A and B present the outcome of the sensitivity analysis of the 
firm classification based on the limits of 20% and 80% to the extent of +/- 10%. In the robustness checks detailed 
in Panel C and D, the dependent variable is a binary dummy variable that can take the values risk manager (0) or 
speculator (1) on an aggregate currency position level, with the risk manager classification as base outcome. Size is 
the logarithm of total assets, size II the logarithm of market capitalization, the R&D [Capex] ratio divides the R&D 
Expense [capital expenditures] by total revenues, the operating cash flow is standardized by total revenues and 
interest coverage is measured by the sum of pretax income plus interest expense, divided by interest expense. The 
[short-term] debt ratio captures total [current] liabilities in relation to total assets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Robustness check “sensitivity analysis” for main regression model 
    Limits of 30% and 70%                        Limits of 10% and 90% 
Dependent Variable Independent 
Variables 
    Coef.         p-value 
 
   Coef.                p-value 
Risk manager Base Outcome 
Frequent speculator Size  -0.301 0.061* -0.248 0.207 
 R&D ratio 12.891 0.000*** 21.484 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -12.620 0.000*** -15.473 0.001*** 
 Debt ratio 2.397 0.131 4.186 0.047** 
 Constant -0.058 0.972 -2.168 0.347 
Temporary speculator Size -0.418 0.006*** -0.404 0.003*** 
 R&D ratio 3.710 0.171 5.017 0.086* 
 Operating CF -5.461 0.076* 3.996 0.209 
 Debt ratio 0.569 0.718 -1.616 0.319 
 Constant 2.226 0.080* 3.553 0.001*** 
Observations   203  203 
Pseudo R-squared   0.170  0.240 
 
Panel B: Robustness check “sensitivity analysis” for alternative regression model 
  Limits of 30% and 70%        Limits of 10% and 90% 
Dependent Variable Independent 
Variables 
  Coef.         p-value 
 
            Coef.             p-value 
Risk manager Base Outcome 
Frequent speculator Size II -0.467 0.000*** -0.454 0.000*** 
 Capex ratio 8.541 0.040** 2.954      0.612 
 Interest coverage -0.002 0.005*** -0.003 0.119 
 Debt ratio short-term 5.365 0.000*** 5.538 0.000*** 
 Constant -0.188 0.828 -0.156 0.885 
Temporary speculator Size II -0.274 0.001*** -0.106 0.146 
 Capex ratio -3.282 0.448 -8.396 0.062* 
 Interest coverage -0.006 0.052* -0.001 0.003*** 
 Debt ratio short-term -0.246 0.838 -0.728 0.464 
 Constant 1.370 0.091* 1.667 0.024** 
Observations         327  327 
Pseudo R-squared   0.121  0.092 
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Panel C: Robustness check “currency position level” for main regression model 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
   Coef.      p-value 
Firm classification Size -0.304 0.000*** 
 R&D ratio 5.428 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -2.829 0.009*** 
 Debt ratio 0.275 0.614 
 Constant 1.540 0.003*** 
Observations 1,097       
Pseudo R-squared 0.131   
 
Panel D: Robustness check “currency position level” for alternative regression model 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
Coef.     p-value 
Firm classification Size II -0.297 0.000*** 
 Capex ratio  2.371 0.087* 
 Interest Coverage -0.001 0.001*** 
 Debt ratio short-term  1.203 0.003*** 
 Constant  1.260 0.000*** 
Observations 1,725        
Pseudo R-squared 0.063   
8. Appendix  
Definition of Variables 
Variables Description of variables 
Size Log (Total Assets) 
Size II Log (Com. Shares Outstanding * Price Close 
Monthly) 
R&D ratio R&D Expense / Total Revenues 
Capex ratio Capital Expenditures / Total Revenues  
Cash ratio (Cash + Short-Term Investments) / Total 
Current Liabilities) 
( )⋅btE  Exposure before hedging in t  
Interest coverage (Pretax Income + Interest Expense) / Interest 
Expense 
Total CF (Operating + Investing + Financing Cash Flow) / Total Revenues 
Operating CF Operating Cash Flow / Total Revenues 
Debt ratio  Total Liabilities / Total Assets 
Debt ratio short term Total Current Liabilities / Total Assets 
( HR ) Hedge ratio with Ebt t tHR H=  percentage of 
FX exposure covered by financial instruments 
( ( )⋅tH ) Hedged amount in t  indicated by derivative 
instruments reported 
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9. For Reviewer Only: Unreported Analysis 
 
Table 6: Robustness Checks: Reduced Speculation Categories  
This table reports the logistic regression results of our firm classification as a function of firm characteristics with 
robust standard errors. The dependent variable is a binary dummy variable that can, per firm, take the values risk 
manager (0) or speculator (1) according to their speculative share relative to total firm exposure, with the risk 
manager classification as base outcome. Based on a limit of 50%, firms are labelled risk manager [speculator] when 
speculating with less [more] than 50% of their exposure. The independent variables are (a selection of) firm 
characteristics detailed in Table 3. Panel A [B] refers to our main [alternative] regression model detailed in Table 4. 
Size is the logarithm of total assets, size II the logarithm of market capitalization, the R&D [Capex] ratio divides the 
R&D Expense [capital expenditures] by total revenues, the operating cash flow is standardized by total revenues and 
interest coverage is measured by the sum of pretax income plus interest expense, divided by interest expense. The 
[short-term] debt ratio captures total [current] liabilities in relation to total assets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Robustness check “reduced speculation categories” for main regression model 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
Coef.     p-value 
Firm classification Size -0.521 0.001*** 
 R&D ratio 10.043 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -5.926 0.021** 
 Debt ratio 2.493 0.083* 
 Constant 1.333 0.354 
Observations 203       
Pseudo R-squared 0.252   
 
Panel B: Robustness check “reduced speculation categories” for alternative regression model 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
Coef.     p-value 
Firm classification Size II -0.511 0.000*** 
 Capex ratio  3.609 0.374 
 Interest Coverage -0.002 0.001*** 
 Debt ratio short-term  3.519 0.001*** 
 Constant  1.246 0.097* 
Observations 327        
Pseudo R-squared 0.177   
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Table 7: Robustness Checks: Alternative Sample Period 
This table reports the multinomial logistic regression results of our firm classification as a function of firm 
characteristics with robust standard errors. The dependent variable can take the values risk manager, frequent 
speculator or temporary speculator according to their speculative share relative to total firm exposure. The 
independent variables are (a selection of) firm characteristics detailed in Table 3. Panel A [B] refers to our main 
[alternative] regression model detailed in Table 4, but limits the sample period to the years 2010 to 2013 [2012 to 
2015]. Size is the logarithm of total assets, size II the logarithm of market capitalization, the R&D [Capex] ratio 
divides the R&D Expense [capital expenditures] by total revenues, the operating cash flow is standardized by total 
revenues and interest coverage is measured by the sum of pretax income plus interest expense, divided by interest 
expense. The [short-term] debt ratio captures total [current] liabilities in relation to total assets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Robustness check “sample period” for main regression model 
       Years 2010 – 2013         Years 2013 – 2015 
Dependent Variable Independent 
Variables 
  Coef.            p-value 
 
     Coef.               p-value 
Risk manager Base Outcome 
Frequent speculator Size -0.390 0.088* -0.475 0.065* 
 R&D ratio 25.322 0.000*** 26.603 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -18.007 0.002*** -16.371 0.001*** 
 Debt ratio 2.560 0.276 5.666 0.019** 
 Constant 0.131 0.960 -1.456 0.599 
Temporary speculator Size -0.422 0.022** -0.271 0.127 
 R&D ratio 15.736 0.000*** 16.992 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -2.815 0.555 -8.526 0.030* 
 Debt ratio 2.921 0.172 -0.500 0.788 
 Constant 0.230 0.886 1.801 0.178 
Observations   131  142 
Pseudo R-squared   0.256  0.265 
 
Panel B: Robustness check “sample period” for alternative regression model 
       Years 2010 – 2013       Years 2013 – 2015 
Dependent Variable Independent 
Variables 
  Coef.           p-value 
 
            Coef.               p-value 
Risk manager Base Outcome 
Frequent speculator Size II -0.540 0.000*** -0.577 0.000*** 
 Capex ratio 10.279      0.026** 10.319 0.019** 
 Interest coverage -0.002 0.064* -0.003 0.143 
 Debt ratio short-term 5.984 0.000*** 7.087 0.000*** 
 Constant -0.139 0.907 -0.146 0.902 
Temporary speculator Size II -0.190 0.053* -0.187 0.059* 
 Capex ratio -7.291 0.230 -15.795 0.016** 
 Interest coverage -0.006 0.027** -0.003 0.007*** 
 Debt ratio short-term 1.334 0.359 0.910 0.499 
 Constant 0.747 0.456 1.277 0.151 
Observations         216  225 
Pseudo R-squared   0.131  0.161 
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